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ChinaTraditional irrigation watermanagement systems in China are increasingly replaced by user-based, participatory
management through water users associations (WUAs) with the purpose to promote, economically and ecolog-
ically beneﬁcial, water savings and increase farm incomes. Existing research shows that signiﬁcant differences
exist in the institutional setup of WUAs in China, and that WUAs have not been universally successful in saving
water and improving farm incomes. This paper aims to examine the underlying causes of differences inWUAper-
formance by analyzing the impact of WUA characteristics on the productivity of irrigation water. Explanatory
variables in our analysis are derived fromAgrawal's user-based resource governance framework. Applying a ran-
dom intercept regression model to data collected among 21 WUAs and 315 households in Minle County in
northern China, we ﬁnd that group characteristics, particularly group size and number of water users groups,
and the existing pressure on available water resources are important factors in water productivity. Resource
characteristics, i.e. resource size and degree of overlap between the WUA boundaries and natural boundaries,
do not signiﬁcantly affect water productivity in our research area.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Water scarcity constitutes a major problem in China, as per capita,
water availability is only a quarter of the world average (Falkenmark
et al., 1989; Shalizi, 2006). Within the country, water resources are dis-
tributed rather unevenly. Water is a very scarce resource in the north,
whilewater availability in the south is less problematic due to abundant
precipitation (World Bank, 2001; Yang et al., 2003; Zhang et al., 2008).
Moreover, due to the monsoon-dependent and continental climate in
the north, rainfall is restricted to a short period of the year in that region.
Yet, almost half of the Chinese population lives in the north, andmost of
the maize, wheat and vegetables is grown there (Calow et al., 2009;
NBS, 2012).
Growing demands for water, particularly in the north, are putting
more and more pressure on China's ability to produce its own food
as agricultural production in China is highly dependent on irriga-
tion water. In northern China, 75% of crop output is generated from ir-
rigated land (Yang et al., 2003). The size of the irrigated area has
rapidly increased in recent decades, from 45 million ha in 1979–81 to
61.7 million ha in 2011 (NBS, 2012; World Bank, 2006). The use of
water for industrial purposes and domestic consumption, however, isroup, Wageningen University,
-NC-ND license.increasingly reducing the amount of water available for agricultural
production. As a share of total water use, the use of water in agriculture
has steadily declined from around 80% in 1980 to 61.3% in 2011 (NBS,
2012; World Bank, 2006).
Technical innovations as well as water policy and management re-
forms are required to improve water use efﬁciency in agriculture to
meet growing food demands (Rosegrant and Cai, 2002; Yang et al.,
2003). Farmers in northern China increasingly resort towater-saving ir-
rigation systems and cultivationmethods, but also greatly increased the
use of groundwater for agricultural production (Wang et al., 2007;
Zhang et al., 2008). As a result, groundwater tables in the Hai River
basin have fallen considerably; evidence on groundwater tables in
other parts of northern China is mixed, however (Qu et al., 2011).
The management of water resources was mainly done through
collective ownership arrangements since the implementation of the
household responsibility system in agriculture at the end of the 1970s/
beginning of the 1980s, with village leaders (representing the village
council) being responsible for water allocation, canal operation and
maintenance and fee collection (Huang et al., 2009). This traditional
management system is similar to the system that governed most of
China's rural water resources during the people's commune system
period.
In recent years, two major types of management reforms can be ob-
served in northern China, namely user-based, participatory manage-
ment through water users associations (WUAs) and contracting out of
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mate that more than one-quarter of the villages in northern China had
replaced traditional management by either WUAs or contracting in
2004. Their study further ﬁnds that water availability, length and
complexity of the canal system and reform-promoting policies of local
governments are the main drivers of water management reforms. In
subsequent research comparing the performance of the three manage-
ment systems, Huang et al. (2010) ﬁnd that WUAs perform better
than traditional management systems in terms of maintenance expen-
ditures, timeliness ofwater delivery and rates of fee collection;manage-
ment systems based on contracting also perform better than traditional
systems, although not as much as WUA-based systems.
The impact of WUAs on farm production, income and water savings
is examined by Wang et al. (2005, 2006, 2010). These studies ﬁnd that
WUAs have not beenuniversally successful in either savingwater or im-
proving farm incomes, and link the performance of water management
systems to the incentives that these new institutions provide to water
managers. Wang et al. (2010) identiﬁes ﬁve key principles that,
according to World Bank project managers, WUAs should satisfy in
order to be successful: (1) There should be adequate and reliable
water supply, (2) the WUA should be organized hydraulically (not ad-
ministratively), (3) leaders should be elected and WUA management
and decision making should be with the farmers (without local govern-
ment interference), (4) water should be charged volumetrically
(not according to land area), and (5) the WUA should have the right
to collect water fees. Empirical evidence among WUAs in Ningxia,
Gansu, Hubei and Hunan Provinces indicates that there are impor-
tant differences in the extent to which these ﬁve key principles are
implemented, and that the degree of implementation has important
implications for water use efﬁciency (Wang et al., 2010). Water use in
rice, wheat and maize in World Bank-supported WUAs, which mostly
operate according to the ﬁve principles, is found to be 15–20% lower
than in traditionally managed villages. In villages where participation
by farmers plays only a minor role and water management reforms
have been only nominally implemented, the establishment of WUAs
has had little effect onwater use. The study further ﬁnds that crop yields
and incomes are not signiﬁcantly different between World Bank-
supported WUAs and other WUAs.
The study by Wang et al. (2010) emphasizes the importance of ﬁve
key principles promoted by the World Bank for successful user-based
water management. It neglects, however, the potential role played by
other factors identiﬁed in the literature on sustainable governance of
common pool resources, such as group size or level of dependence on
the resource system. A large group size may negatively affect collective
management of water because it intensiﬁes problems of collective ac-
tion and free-riding. A high participation in off-farm employment
amongWUAmembers, andhence a low reliance on agricultural produc-
tion, may reduce the incentives of group members for improving agri-
cultural water use. Policies that narrowly focus on promoting the ﬁve
key principles may be less successful in stimulating water savings
through sustainable user-based water management if such additional
factors that may play a role in user-based decisionmaking are not prop-
erly taken into account. Empirical research that identiﬁes the relative
importance of different factors inﬂuencing the performance of user-
based water management is needed to underpin such policies. To our
knowledge, however, no rigid empirical studies of user-based water
management on the basis of an established framework of common
pool resource management have been carried out so far in the case of
China.
This study uses the sustainable governance of common-pool re-
sources framework presented by Agrawal (2003) to examine the con-
ditions for successful user-based management of irrigation water in
northern China. A number of studies have discussed the conditions
under which user groups will sustainably govern common-pool re-
sources such as irrigation water (e.g., Binswanger-Mkhize et al., 2010;
Meinzen-Dick, 2007; Ostrom, 1990a,b; Slangen et al., 2008). Agrawal(2003) summarizes the conclusions of three inﬂuential studies by
Baland and Platteau (1996), Ostrom (1990a) and Wade (1988) and
further extends the set of determinants distinguished in these studies.
We choose to apply Agrawal's framework instead of the more recent
framework presented by Ostrom (2007, 2009, 2010), because it in-
cludes relationships between resources and user groups and their exter-
nal environment (markets, technology), which may play an important
role in the Chinese context.
We estimate a random intercept regression model of the impact of
various WUA characteristics on two indicators of water productivity,
i.e. total crop production value and cropping income, both expressed
per m3 of water. The empirical analysis is based on data collected
among 315 households and 21 WUAs in Minle County, Zhangye City,
Gansu Province for the year 2009. Zhangye City is located in the middle
reaches of the Heihe River basin. The Heihe River basin is one of three
large inland river basins in northwest China, together with the Tarim
and Shiyang river basins, where a comprehensive ecological water con-
veyance project has been implemented since the year 2000 to address
the severely degraded ecological environment in their lower reaches
(Wang et al., 2013). Due to overexploitation of the water resources in
the middle reaches of Heihe River since the 1960s, water resources
discharged to the lower reaches signiﬁcantly decreased and led to de-
clining groundwater levels, worsening water quality, reduced vegeta-
tion and severe desertiﬁcation and thereby transforming it into one of
China's “sandstorm cradles” (Guo et al., 2009).
The ecological water conveyance project includes ecological water
transfer, grazing bans, resettlement of herdsmen, and the development
of water-efﬁcient agricultural practices (Wang et al., 2013). It has
achieved obvious ecological beneﬁts in terms of groundwater tables,
biodiversity and vegetation recovery, According to Guo et al. (2009),
however, the geographical scale of these beneﬁcial changes is still limit-
ed. In order to fundamentally solve the ecological environment problem
in the lower reaches of theHeihe River, they formulate a number of pol-
icy recommendations including popularization of water-saving irriga-
tion techniques and reducing the water use volume for agricultural
irrigation in the midstream reaches of the basin. By examining the im-
pact of WUA characteristics on water productivity for WUAs located in
the middle reaches of the Heihe River basin, this paper intends to con-
tribute to policies that simultaneously increase agricultural output,
raise farmers' incomes and improve downstream ecological conditions.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses in
more detail the research area and the method of data collection. In
Section 3, we discuss howwe implement Agrawal's framework, present
descriptive statistics of the WUA characteristics that we include in our
analysis, and discuss the expected effects of these characteristics on
the productivity of irrigationwater. Subsequently, in Section 4, we spec-
ify the regression model that we use for our analysis and present de-
scriptive statistics for the dependent variables and control variables.
The regression results of our model are presented in Section 5. The
ﬁnal section summarizes the main ﬁndings and discusses their implica-
tions for the ongoing water management reforms in northern China.2. Research Area and Data Collection
The data used for our researchwere collected via a household survey
and a WUA survey held in May 2010 in Minle County, Zhangye City,
Gansu Province. Zhangye City is an oasis located midstream of the
Heihe River, an inland river that ﬂows across Qinghai Province, Gansu
Province and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. It originates from
the Qilianshan Mountains in Qinghai province and ends in Juyanhai
Lake in InnerMongolia. In the midstream of the Heihe River watershed,
the land is ﬂat, sunshine is abundant, and annual precipitation is very
lowwhile evaporation is high. However, due to the availability of irriga-
tion water from the Heihe River, the area has become a major grain and
vegetables production base in Gansu province.
2 In the survey carried out inMay 2010, we interviewed 265 households that were also
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water resources, even though it uses up almost all the water of Heihe
River. Only 50% of the farmland is well irrigated, and much arable land
has been abandoned due towater shortage. Agriculture accounts for ap-
proximately 95% of all water use and almost all water in the Heihe River
is extracted for irrigation use. As a result, too little water ﬂows into
Juyanhai Lake; the lake dried out in 1992, turning an area of 200 km2
around the lake into a desert (MWR, 2004; Zhang et al., 2009).
To reduce the overuse of irrigation water in the middle reaches, the
Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) initiated a pilot project called
‘Building a Water-saving Society in Zhangye City’ in 2002. The project,
the ﬁrst project of its type in the country, was designed to save water
through government investments in a water-saving irrigation system
and in meters for measuring water use and through establishing a
water use rights (WUR) system with tradable water quotas. The ﬁrst
two measures decreased irrigation water use somewhat, but trading
of WUR did not become popular (Zhang et al., 2009).
Minle County, one of the six counties in Zhangye City, is located be-
tween the foothills of the Qilian Mountains and the lower lying Hexi
corridor. Its total cultivated land area equals 860,000 mu,1 with irrigat-
ed land constituting 67%. Major crops in Minle County include barley,
wheat, maize, sesame, rapeseed, garlic and potato. Surface water is the
major water resource for irrigated agriculture in the area. Due to the
high costs of pumping water from the wells, the use of groundwater is
less than 5% of total water use in irrigated agriculture (source: Water
Bureau of Minle County).
Agricultural land in Minle County is usually divided into three zones
with different planting conditions and water requirements. Zone 1 has
an elevation ranging from 1600 to 2000 m. Precipitation in this zone
is relatively scarce. Zone 2 is located between 2000 and 2200 m, while
zone 3 has an elevation ranging from 2200 to 2600 m. By far, the largest
zone is the second one, with 500,000 mu of cultivated land, followed by
the ﬁrst and third zones, with 190,000 and 170,000 mu respectively.
Due to the relatively high rainfall in zone 3, it relies less on irrigation
than the other two zones.
The water used for surface irrigation is stored in seven reservoirs in
the Qilianshan Mountains, serving ﬁve irrigation areas within Minle
County. Five water management bureaus (WMBs), one for each of the
ﬁve irrigation areas, arrange the water allocations to WUAs within
their own irrigation area. WUAs are responsible for arranging the
water distribution to households belonging to their own WUA. WUA
are sub-divided into water users groups (WUGs), consisting of house-
holds having plots along the same channel. Since the plots of different
households within a WUG are irrigated at the same time, households
belonging to a WUG need to coordinate their planting decisions and
water demands.
Irrigation is carried out by ﬂooding adjacent farmland at the same
time, organized from lowest to highest altitudes, with villages in the
ﬁrst zone receiving more irrigation rounds (generally three) per year
than the villages in the other two zones (generally one or two rounds).
Standardwater quantities permuare assigned for each irrigation round,
but these quantities are only realized in years of abundant rainfall.
Water is allocated according to a quota system based on the size of
the so-called WUR land of the farmers. Not all the irrigated land is clas-
siﬁed asWUR land. Its size depends on the labor provided by a village to
the construction of the reservoir and some other factors (likeWUR land
obtained through auctions).
The household survey andWUA survey data used in this study were
collected in May 2010 by staff and students from Gansu Academy of
Social Sciences in Lanzhou, Gansu Agricultural University in Lanzhou,
and Nanjing Agricultural University. The data cover information for
the year 2009. Household interviews were done in the same 21 villages1 15 mu equals 1 ha.where a similar household surveywas held inMay 20082 (seeWachong
Castro et al. (2010) for a description of the sampling method). This
resulted in a household-level dataset containing 315 observations. Be-
cause some crucial information needed for the analysis in this study is
missing in thedata set for 2007,we only use the data set for 2009. It con-
tains information about crop production, use of water and other inputs,
WUA participation, water and other prices, land tenure and land use,
and so on.
For theWUA survey,we interviewed leaders ofWUAs in the same21
villages. The WUA survey covers information about water allocation,
water trading and water exchange between WUAs, water-saving and
canal maintenance activities, WUA management, income and expendi-
tures of WUAs, and so on.
To obtain more background information, the WMBs of the seven ir-
rigation areas in Minle County were interviewed by the ﬁrst author in
August 2010. Questions asked during these interviews include the
water allocation to WUAs within each irrigation area, the contents and
participants of water management meetings organized by the WMBs,
payments for water by the WUAs, and so on.
3. Characteristics of the Examined WUAs
In this section, we use Agrawal's theoretical framework (Agrawal,
2003) to examine the characteristics of the 21 surveyed WUAs in
Minle County and to develop hypotheses on their expected effects on
sustainable irrigation water management. In doing so, we focus on
onemajor aspect of sustainable watermanagement, namely water pro-
ductivity. The discussion in this sectionwill follow the same grouping of
characteristics as in Agrawal's framework, but is limited to the charac-
teristics for which information is available and show a sufﬁcient degree
of variation in our data set.3
3.1. Characteristics of the Resource
We take the following two resource characteristics identiﬁed by
Agrawal (2003) into account in our analysis.
• Resource size
We use the length of 2nd level canals within aWUA as an indicator of
the size of water resources. In our research area, 1st level canals feed
water from the reservoir to 2nd level canals. WUAs distribute the
water from the 2nd level canals that they manage over the 3rd and
4th level canals. Farmers' ﬁelds are usually located alongside the 4th
level canals. The length of the 2nd level canals varies from 0.3 to
20 km for the WUAs in our sample, with an average length of
5.68 km (see Table 1). We expect that water productivity is higher
in WUAs with a smaller size, as measured by the length of their 2nd
level canals, because use and misuse of water is easier to monitor in
such WUAs.
• Resource boundaries
Well-deﬁned resource boundaries make it easier to exclude outsiders
from using the resource. The boundaries of all the 21 WUAs that
we use in the regression analysis correspond to the boundaries of
administrative villages. All resource boundaries therefore seem to be
well-deﬁned in our sample. As a consequence we do not include an
indicator for this resource characteristic in our analysis of water
productivity.
Village boundaries, however, often do not correspond to the natural
boundaries of the water resource. Some WUAs are located along one
2nd level canal, while others are located along two, or even three orinterviewed two years before. The other 50 households could not be found, and were re-
placed by other randomly selected households within the same village.
3 Variables dropped due to a very small degree of variation include the share of ethnic
minorities among themember households (as an indicator of shared norms) and (former)
village leadership of the WUA leader (as an indicator of appropriate leadership).
5 These values are based on the answers provided by the leaders ofWUAs. The variation
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of WUA characteristics.
Indicators Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Resource characteristics
Length of 2nd level canals km 5.68 5.61 0.3 20
Number of 2nd level canals 2.05 0.86 1 4
Group characteristics
Number of households 276 190 37 630
Age of WUA leader Years 46.3 6.76 35 59
Share of households with per capita land N twice the average % 5.80 11.1 0 40
Number of WUGs 8.29 4.71 3 20
Share of poor households % 28.8 25.1 0 90
Relationship between resource and group characteristics
Share of households with migrant heads % 35.2 22.8 0.83 75.2
Water demand at current water price level 10,000 m3/hh 0.572 0.426 0.02 1.44
Governance
Expenses on guards per mu of WUR land RMB/mu 0.22 0.34 0 1.24
Involvement of WUA in cropping decision 1 = yes, 0 = no 0.33 0.48 0 1
External environment
Percentage of land planted with marketed crops % 8.16 6.47 0 28.3
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canals in a WUA as an indicator of the degree of overlap between
the WUA boundaries and the natural boundaries, and expect that
WUAs with fewer 2nd level canals have a higher productivity of
water use.
3.2. Group Characteristics
Five group characteristics, that are expected to facilitate institutional
success in the sustainable governance of common pool resources in
Agrawal's framework, are included in our empirical analysis.
• Group size
We use the number of households within a WUA as an indicator of
group size. It varies from 37 to 630 in our sample, with a mean size
of 276 households (see Table 1). We expect that WUAs with fewer
households have higher water productivity, because small groups
can overcome problems of collective action and free-riding more
easily.
• Group leadership
Appropriate leadership facilitates efﬁcient rules setting, and therefore
is expected to stimulate higher water productivity. We use the age of
theWUA leader as an indicator of group leadership. It ranges from 35
to 59 in our sample, with amean value of 46. A relative old leadermay
receive more respect frommember households, and therefore be able
to establish more efﬁcient rules. On the other hand, younger leaders
may be more familiar with changing external circumstances. Hence,
the impact of the age of the leader on water productivity may be pos-
itive or negative.
• Heterogeneity of endowments
Heterogeneity of endowments is expected to have a positive effect on
resource management, through enhancing the possibility of collective
action (Baland and Platteau, 1996). The underlying argument is that
organizing a community for collective action involves large start-up
costs; wealthy elites that have a relatively large economic interest
in the resource can afford to invest extra effort in initiating and
maintaining collective action as they stand to beneﬁt most from sus-
tainable collectivemanagement of the resource (Nagendra, 2011). Be-
cause use of irrigationwater is closely linked to land endowments, we
use the proportion of households with per capita land more than
twice the average4 as an indicator of endowment heterogeneity. Its
value varies from 0 to 40% in our sample, with an average value of4 The average of households within the same village.5.8%. We expect a positive relationship between this variable and
water productivity.
• Homogeneity of interests
WUAs with members having a relatively high degree of homogeneity
of identities and interests are more likely to have common concerns.
In our analysis, joint interests in agricultural production and water
savings are likely to be an important factor in water productivity.
These interests are expected to be very similar within WUGs, but
may differ considerably between WUGs. We therefore use the num-
ber of WUGs within a WUA as an indicator of the homogeneity of
interests (in agriculture and water savings), and expect that it is neg-
atively related to water productivity. The value of this variable varies
from 3 to 20, with a mean value of 8.29 (see Table 1).
• Poverty level
Poor households are expected to bemore interested in achieving indi-
vidual rather than common goals. We use the proportion of house-
holds with an income lower than 1200 RMB per capita per year,
which is the poverty line of Gansu Province in 2009, as an indicator
of the level of poverty in a WUA. Using this deﬁnition, the share of
poor households ranges between 0 and 90% for theWUAs in our sam-
ple, with an average value of 28.8%. We expect that WUAs with rela-
tively low poverty shares have higher water productivity.
3.3. Relationship between Resource and Group Characteristics
A third category identiﬁed in Agrawal's framework reﬂects the rela-
tionship between resource characteristics and group characteristics.We
use two indicators of such relationships in our analysis.
• Resource dependence
In successful cases of self-organization, users are either dependent on
the resource system for a substantial portion of their livelihoods or
attach high value to the sustainability of the resource. Otherwise, the
costs of organizing and maintaining a self-governing system may
not be worth the effort (Ostrom, 2009). We use the share of house-
holds in a WUA with heads that migrate at least six months per year
as an indicator of the degree of dependence of the resource. Its value
varies from 0.8 to 75.2%, with a mean value of 35.2%.5 We expect
that WUAs with a higher share of migrating household heads have
lower water productivity.in actual migration rates of household heads may be less extreme than these answers
suggest.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics of dependent variables.
Variables Unit No. of
observ.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Crop production value
per m3 of water
RMB/m3 302 1.96 1.57 0.29 13.5
Cropping income per
m3 of water
RMB/m3 302 1.12 1.49 −4.76 11.2
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High levels of unmet demand for water may increase the possibilities
of conﬂicts among users, which are expected to be negatively related
with successful joint action (Agrawal, 2003; Ostrom, 2009). On the
other hand, when users' demand for water is high, they may have
more incentives for savingwater use. In the survey, a questionwas in-
cluded that asked the amount of water that the WUA was willing to
buy, if there were no constraints, at the current water price level.
The resulting water demand level divided by the number of house-
holds within a WUA is used as the indicator of the level of demand
in our analysis. Its value varies from 200 to 14,400 m3 for the WUAs
in our sample, with a mean value of 5720 m3. We expect that WUAs
with a lower demand for water have a higher water productivity.3.4. Governance6
Our data set contains information on two variables that reﬂect the
governance and institutional arrangements within WUAs.
• Monitoring processes
Adequatemonitoring of water use is essential for a proper functioning
of WUAs and for increasing water productivity levels. The use of sur-
face water for irrigation is measured in a similar way throughout
Minle County as part of the water-saving pilot project in Zhangye
City (see Section 2). Important differences exist, however, in expenses
on guards that prevent water stealing. Prevention of water stealing
may affect successful joint action in irrigation water use and therefore
also result in higherwater productivity. Expenses on guards vary from
0 to 1.24 RMB per mu for theWUAs in our sample, with a mean value
of 0.22 RMB (see Table 1). Guards may increasewater productivity by
reducing water stealing, but expenses on guards may be higher in
WUAswheremore water stealing occurs. Hence, the expected impact
of this variable on water productivity is indeterminate.
• Operational rules
A bottom-up approach to rules setting and enforcement is seen as
an important factor in sustainable joint resource management. In
Agrawal's framework, this means that governments should not inter-
fere in the way WUAs operate. In a similar vein, we may argue that
WUA interference in households' decisions may negatively affect
water productivity of member households. On the other hand, WUA
decisions are taken jointly by member households instead of an out-
side authority with limited knowledge of local conditions. Hence, it
is unclear a priori whether WUA involvement in cropping decisions
has a positive or a negative impact on water productivity of its mem-
ber households.Weuse a dummyvariable that reﬂectswhether or not
theWUA is involved in cropping decisions made by households as an
indicator of WUA interference. Of the households in our sample, 33%
report WUA involvement in their cropping decisions (see Table 1).3.5. External Environment
A distinguishing feature of Agrawal's framework is the emphasis
placed on the impact of the external environment on successful man-
agement of the commons.
• Articulation with external markets
External markets form an important external stress factor on resource
systems. The level of articulation with external markets is therefore
expected to affect water productivity negatively. We use the propor-
tion of land planted withmarketed crops as an indicator of this factor.
Its value varies from0 to 28.3% in our dataset, with an average value of
8.16%.6 The terminology used for this set of characteristics resembles more closely the termi-
nology in Ostrom (2009).4. Model Speciﬁcation
The econometric model that we use for our empirical analysis ex-
plains irrigation water productivity of WUA member households from
the WUA characteristics discussed in Section 3. Water productivity is
an indicator of the performance of irrigation systems (Keller et al.,
1996), and is a measure of partial productivity that indicates how efﬁ-
ciently the system converts water into valuable outputs (Molden et al.,
1998). The assessment of water productivity has attracted attention
from many researchers (e.g., Clemmens and Molden, 2007; Kassam
et al., 2007; Rockstrom and Barron, 2007; Steduto et al., 2007).
The two dependent variables in the model that we will examine are
total crop production value and household income from crop produc-
tion,7 both expressed per m3 of water. The ﬁrst indicator measures
water savings achieved by either using water saving irrigation tech-
niques and management methods or by changes in crop choice. These
water savings not only affect the total production value of crops, but
may also affect the costs of inputs (including irrigation water) that
farmers use for growing these crops and hence the proﬁts that farmers
make. To examine these consequences, we also run the regression with
household cropping income per m3 of water as dependent variable.
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the two dependent vari-
ables. The total value of crops harvested by farmers in the research re-
gion equals on average 1.96 RMB per m3 of irrigation water, while
average cropping income amounts to 1.12 RMB per m3 of water.
Besides WUA characteristics, we include agricultural production in-
puts and agro-ecological zone dummies as control variables in the
model. This gives the following speciﬁcation for the regression model:
WPij ¼ f Wj; Fij;Dij
 
þ εij for i ¼ 1;…;315; j ¼ 1;…;21 ð1Þ
where:
WPij Water productivity for household i in WUA j;
Wj Set of 12 WUA characteristics for WUA j;
Fij Set of 10 agricultural production inputs for household i in
WUA j;
Dj Set of two agro-ecological zone dummies for WUA j;
εij Random disturbance terms with standard properties.
Descriptive statistics of the 12 WUA characteristics, and the ex-
pected impact of each indicator on water productivity, were discussed
in Section 3. In addition, ten agricultural production factors and variable
inputs and two agro-ecological zone dummies are included as control
factors in the regression equations (Table 3).
Besides cultivated land size, labor input, machines value, irrigation
water use and fertilizer and seed use, we also include two indicators
of thequality of the land and twohuman capital indicators in the regres-
sionmodel. All these variables are expected to have a positive impact on
crop production value per unit water. Their impact on cropping income7 Income is calculated as revenues, incl. the value of own food consumption,minus costs
of input use, incl. water fees paid by households.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics of other explanatory variables.
Variables Unit No. of observ. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Agricultural production inputs
Land mu 312 19.6 11.1 1.60 71.3
Labor days 310 145 126 6.0 862
Machines RMB 310 1026 755 45 4680
Water m3 308 8880 6409 544 42,800
Fertilizer jin 312 3872 2534 360 15,312
Seed jin 309 1264 773 13 3960
Fertility of land 1 = good,
0 = otherwise
312 0.58 0.49 0 1
Slope of land 1 = ﬂat,
0 = otherwise
312 0.96 0.20 0 1
Age of head Years 315 46.4 10.2 23 78
Education of head Years 314 7.52 3.51 0 15
Agro-ecological zones
D1 1 = zone 1
0 = otherwise
315 0.23 0.42 0 1
D2 1 = zone 2
0 = otherwise
315 0.62 0.49 0 1
133L. Zhang et al. / Ecological Economics 95 (2013) 128–136per unit water is indeterminate, except for the two land quality vari-
ables, because the costs of using inputs may be larger than the produc-
tivity gains they generate.
Two dummy variables are included in the regression equation
to control for the differences in agro-ecological conditions between
the three zones inMinle County (see Section 2). Crops planted at higher
altitudes need less irrigation water. Hence, the dummies for zone 1
and zone 2 are both expected to have a negative impact on water
productivity.Table 4
Expected effects of explanatory variables.
Variable Expected effect
Resource characteristics
Length of 2nd level canals −
Number of 2nd level canals −
Group characteristics
Number of households −
Age of WUA leader +/−
Households with per capita land more than twice the average +
Number of water users groups −
Share of poor households −
Relationship between resource and group characteristics
Share of households with migrant heads −
Water demand at current water price level −
Governance
Expenses on guards per mu of WUR land +/−
Involvement of WUA in cropping decision (1 = yes, 0 = no) +/−
External environment
Share of land planted with marketed crops −
Agricultural production inputs
Land + (+/−)a
Labor + (+/−)
Machines + (+/−)
Water + (+/−)
Fertilizer + (+/−)
Seed + (+/−)
Fertility of land (1 = good, 0 = otherwise) +
Slope of land (1 = ﬂat, 0 = otherwise) +
Age of head + (+/−)
Education of head + (+/−)
Agro-ecological zones
D1 (1 = zone 1, 0 = otherwise) −
D2 (1 = zone 2, 0 = otherwise) −
a Expected sign in cropping income equation is listed between brackets.The expected signs of the impact of each of theWUA characteristics
(discussed in Section 3) and control variables (discussed in the current
section) on water productivity are summarized in Table 4.
We use a Cobb–Douglas speciﬁcation for the agricultural production
inputs, with (the logarithms of) land size, labor input, machines value,
fertilizer use and seed use expressed per unit water, and dummy vari-
ables entering the model in a linear way. For reasons of consistency,
we enter the WUA characteristics in a similar way into the model,
i.e. using logarithmic transformations for all variables except the
dummyvariables. Four of thenon-dummyexplanatory variables, name-
ly share of householdswith per capita land exceeding twice the average,
share of poor households, expenses on guards and education of head,
have a number of zero observations. We use the method proposed by
Battese (1997) for estimating amodel with logarithmic transformations
of these variables.5. Regression Results
As is evident from Eq. (1), we use hierarchical data in the models,
with variables varying at two different levels (i.e., household and
WUA level). A suitable method to estimate linear models in which the
explanatory variables vary at two ormore different levels is the random
intercept model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).
Eq. (1) was estimated for the 315 households in our data set using
the random intercept method. Table 5 shows the regression results for
each of the two dependent variables. Due to missing data for a number
of variables, the sample size for the crop production value equals 302. In
addition, we had to drop 30 households with negative crop incomes for
the estimation of the crop income equation. This gave us 272 observa-
tions for estimating that equation.
The results indicate that resource characteristics do not signiﬁcantly
affect water productivity. Both the length of the 2nd level canals and
the number of those canals within aWUA do not have a statistically sig-
niﬁcant impact on the productivity of water among farm households in
our sample.8 Hence, the hypothesis that water productivity is notably
higher in smaller water resources, because water misuse is easier to
monitor, is rejected for our research area.8 High correlations between resource characteristics and group characteristics may po-
tentially affect our ﬁndings. The correlation coefﬁcient of length of second-level canals and
number of households in a WUA, however, is only 0.05. And the correlation coefﬁcient of
number of second-level canals and number ofWUGs is 0.10. Likewise, no problematic cor-
relationswere found for the other explanatory variables in themodel. The correlationma-
trix can be obtained from the ﬁrst author upon request.
Table 5
Regression results for water productivity, random intercept model.
ln(Crop production
value/Water)
ln(Cropping
income/Water)
Resource characteristics
ln(Length of 2nd level canals) −0.052
(−0.93)
0.132
(1.06)
ln(Number of 2nd level canals) −0.143
(−1.40)
0.105
(0.45)
Group characteristics
ln(Number of households) −0.275***
(−2.91)
−0.735***
(−3.35)
ln(Age of WUA leader) −0.251
(−0.99)
1.32**
(2.24)
ln(Share of households with per capita
land N twice the average)
0.303***
(3.90)
0.533***
(3.12)
ln(Number of water users groups) 0.409***
(3.27)
0.846***
(2.91)
ln(Share of poor households) −0.064
(−1.41)
−0.126
(−1.19)
Relationship between resource and group characteristics
ln(Share of households with migrant heads) 0.076*
(1.87)
0.098
(1.08)
ln(Water demand at current price) −0.161**
(−2.32)
−0.026
(−0.17)
Governance
ln(Expenses on guards) −0.014
(−0.72)
−0.010
(−0.23)
Involvement of WUA in cropping decision
(1 = yes, 0 = no)
0.204***
(2.93)
0.582***
(3.62)
External environment
ln(Share of land planted with marketed crops) −0.094
(−0.97)
−0.432*
(−1.89)
Agricultural production inputs
ln(Land/Water) 0.620***
(6.92)
0.920***
(4.31)
ln(Labor/Water) 0.004
(0.12)
0.064
(0.97)
ln(Machines/Water) 0.021
(0.53)
0.052
(0.59)
ln(Water) −0.012
(−0.30)
0.251**
(2.54)
ln(Fertilizer/Water) 0.161***
(2.63)
−0.023
(−0.16)
ln(Seed/Water) 0.081
(1.63)
−0.047
(−0.42)
ln(Age of head) 0.032
(0.32)
−0.082
(−0.36)
ln(Education of head) −0.004
(−0.13)
−0.069
(−0.94)
Fertility of land
(1 = good, 0 = otherwise)
0.076
(1.60)
0.198*
(1.82)
Slope of land
(1 = ﬂat, 0 = otherwise)
0.230**
(2.02)
0.008
(0.03)
Agro-ecological zones
D1
(1 = zone 1, 0 = otherwise)
−0.271**
(−2.17)
−0.192
(−0.69)
D2
(1 = zone 2, 0 = otherwise)
−0.366***
(−2.93)
−0.130
(−0.46)
Intercept 5.62***
(5.52)
2.55
(1.08)
Number of observations 302 272
Number of WUAs 21 21
R2 (overall) 0.67 0.37
Wald chi2 539.86*** 141.63***
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
respectively. z-Statistics are in parentheses.
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signiﬁcant role in achieving water savings. Three out of the ﬁve exam-
ined group characteristics have a strongly signiﬁcant impact of a
household's crop production value per cubic meter of water. Thenumber of households in a WUA has a signiﬁcant negative impact,
thereby providing supportive evidence for the hypothesis that a large
group size may exacerbate problems of collective action and free riding
in joint water management. Our results further support the hypothesis
that heterogeneity of endowments, as measured by the percentage of
households with per capita land more than twice the average, is an im-
portant precondition for successful collective action. Heterogeneity of
interests, as measured by the number of WUGs in a WUA, has a signiﬁ-
cant positive impact on crop production per m3 water value in our re-
gression results. In theory, groups having heterogeneous interests are
expected to have lower water productivity. The number of WUGs in a
WUAmay not be an adequate indicator of theheterogeneity of interests,
because households in our case study region generally belong to more
than oneWUG. In fact, households inWUAswith a relatively large num-
ber ofWUGs may have more options for crop diversiﬁcation and have a
better tuning of planting and irrigation decisions among member
households, and thereby obtain a relatively high water productivity.
All the three variables that have signiﬁcant impact on crop production
per m3 water are also found to signiﬁcantly affect cropping income
per m3 water. Besides these, the age of WUA leader has signiﬁcantly
positive impact on the cropping income per unit water, probably be-
cause that relative old leader may receive more respect from member
households.
The third group of WUA characteristic that we examine consists of
two indicators of the relationship between resource characteristics and
group characteristics. They are both found to signiﬁcantly affect crop
production value but not the cropping income per unit water. The esti-
mated coefﬁcients are positive for the share ofmigrant household heads
and negative for water demand at the current price. The latter ﬁnding
provides supporting evidence for the hypothesis that higher water de-
mand may lead to more conﬂicts among users and hence to fewer
water savings. But the hypothesis that smaller resource dependence
negatively affects joint action in water management is not supported
by the result for share of migrant heads in a WUA. In fact, we ﬁnd that
the share ofmigrant heads has a signiﬁcant positive impact on crop pro-
duction value per unit of water (at a 10% testing level), but not on the
cropping incomeper unit water. Theseﬁndings suggest that households
in WUAs with relatively many migrant heads have higher water pro-
ductivity because they spend relatively more on productive inputs. In
other words, using the terminology of the so-called new economics of
labor migration (e.g., Taylor and Martin, 2001), we ﬁnd evidence of a
positive income effect that dominates the negative lost-labor effect of
migration plus the negative resource dependency effect outlined above.
There are two governance variables in our model. Expenses on
guards do not signiﬁcantly affect water productivity in neither of the
two estimated equations. Hence, the two counteracting effects of this
variable on water productivity seem to more or less balance each
other. For WUA involvement in cropping decisions, we ﬁnd a signiﬁ-
cantly positive impact on crop production value and cropping income
per unit of water. This ﬁnding suggests that jointly decided crop choices
lead to higher water productivity than crop choices made by individual
households within a WUA.
The lastWUA characteristic that we consider in our analysis refers to
the external environment. The hypothesis that external markets indeed
put more pressure on water resources and therefore lead to lower
water productivity is not supported by our results, because the estimat-
ed coefﬁcient for this variable in the crop production value equation is
not signiﬁcantly different from zero. We do ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative
impact of the share of land plantedwithmarketed crops on cropping in-
come per unit water. In other words, these results suggest that house-
holds that are relatively more involved in marketed crops can afford
to buy more productive inputs, but these inputs do not cause a higher
total crop production per unit water.
The regression results for the control variables conﬁrm that land size
is a crucial determinant of agricultural production in China, given the
scarcity of cultivated land. Controlling for other determining factors,
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(zone 3). Households living in that zone rely more on rainfall, and
hence need less irrigation water than farm households living in the
other two zones. Cropping income per unit water, however, is not sig-
niﬁcantly affected. Hence, households living in zone 3 achieve the
higher productivity by spending relatively more on productive inputs.
6. Conclusion
This study examineswhich characteristics ofWUAs play a signiﬁcant
role in promoting water productivity among the households belonging
to aWUA in northern China. Data collected among 315 households and
21WUAs inMinle County, Gansu Province for the year 2009 are used to
estimate a random intercept model explaining total crop production
value and cropping income per cubic meter of water.
Previous research on WUAs and performance of user-based water
management in northern China has concentrated on the ﬁve so-called
key principles, identiﬁed and promoted by World Bank project
managers, that WUAs should satisfy. These are: adequate and reliable
water supply, hydraulically (not administratively) organized WUAs,
elected leaders and no government interference in WUA management
and decision making, water payments based on used quantities, and
water fees collection rights with the WUA. Our research broadens the
analysis by examining a range of potentially important factors identiﬁed
in the literature on sustainable common pool resource management.
Model speciﬁcation in our study is derived from a comprehensive
framework developed by Agrawal (2003). The regression results that
we obtain indicate that group characteristics, particularly group size
and number of sub-groups, are important factors in water productivity.
Large groups tend to have greater difﬁculties in overcomingproblems of
collective action and free-riding. A large number of sub-groups, i.e.,
water users groups (WUGs), within aWUA can promote water produc-
tivity by allowing more crop diversiﬁcation and by a better tuning of
planting and irrigation decisions among member households. Another
group characteristic that affects water productivity in our sample is het-
erogeneity of land endowments, which is found to have a positive effect
on water productivity of member households in a WUA.
Several other factors listed in Agrawal's framework are found to af-
fect water productivity in our research area. In particular we ﬁnd that
a high pressure on the water resource caused by a large unmet water
demand negatively affects water savings in crop production, while the
share of households with migrant heads in a WUA positively affects
the productivity of water use. Another noteworthy result is that we do
not ﬁnd evidence that resource characteristics, i.e., resource size and de-
gree of overlap between the WUA boundaries and natural boundaries,
affect water productivity in our research area.
Our ﬁndings have important implications for the ongoing water
management reforms in northern China in general, and in the middle
reaches of the Heihe River in particular. Increasing water productivity
is of crucial importance for maintaining food self-sufﬁciency, a major
national-level policy goal in China. And it is also needed to meet the
growingwater demand from non-agricultural sectors, including the en-
vironment. Consequently, it may contribute to achieving food self-
sufﬁciency as well as environmental goals, such as improving the eco-
logical environment in the downstream reaches of north-western
China's inland rivers, at the same time.
WUAs established on the basis of the ﬁve key principles identiﬁed
and promoted byWorld Bank project managers may play an important
role in this respect, as convincingly shown by Wang et al. (2010). Our
ﬁndings show that a number of factors that are commonly identiﬁed
in the literature on sustainable management of common pool resources
also need to be taken into account if WUAs are to be successful in pro-
moting higher water use efﬁciencies. In particular we ﬁnd that WUAs
with a relatively small number of member households, a large number
of WUGs, and a low pressure on the available water resources are
more likely to achieve relatively high water use efﬁciencies. Watermanagement reforms in northern China are more likely to be success-
ful in stimulating water productivity, and thereby simultaneously
achieving economic and ecological beneﬁts, if these characteristics are
taken into account and, wherever possible, manipulated in appropriate
directions.
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